We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firm profit and firm size may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively abundant is a net exporter of the manufactured good, while both firms' size and profits are lower in this country than in the country where capital is relatively scarce. By contrast, the pricing policy adopted by firms does not depend on capital endowment and country asymmetry. It is determined by the nature of preferences: when demand elasticity increases (decreases) with consumption, firms practice dumping (reverse-dumping).
Introduction
New trade theories have raised new and important questions. How do asymmetry between countries and trade liberalization aect rms' size, trade ows, and price policies? How do they aect countries' specialization and do factor-owners benet from trade liberalization? Apart from a few exceptions, these questions have been addressed in the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1987; Feenstra, 2004 ). Yet, it is now well known that this model is unable to replicate facts that are well documented in the empirical trade literature: In this paper, we revisit some of the questions addressed in new trade theories using a setting whose aim is to assess the compatibility of the corresponding results with the recent empirical evidence as well as their robustness. To this end, we develop a new model that has the following two distinctive features: preferences display variable elasticity of substitution and countries have capital endowments that dier from the relative population size. Specically, we consider a trade setting with two countries that are asymmetric in endowments, namely, capital-rich Home and capital-poor Foreign, while consumers share non-CES preferences. This allows us to deal with questions that have been left aside in many existing theoretical contributions: (i) what happens when the capital/population diers across countries, (ii) how does trade liberalization aect rms' size and prots, and (iii) do and how rms price discriminate across countries?
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, we nd that the country with the higher (smaller) capital/population ratio is a net exporter of the manufacturing (agricultural) good. In other words, partial specialization of countries takes place and a Krugman-type home market eect (Krugman, 1980) is observed. This result is in the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade. In addition, we show that both the capital price and rm size are smaller in the country with the higher capital/population ratio. In other words, the relative abundance of capital makes the capital-owners worse-o and leads to a larger number of smaller rms.
Second, unlike in the CES case, we show that trade liberalization aects rms' size. Specically, the size of a rm is now variable and determined by the interaction between the following three eects: the standard competition eect, which stems from better accessibility to local markets by foreign competitors; the standard market-access eect due to better accessibility of foreign markets to the domestic rms; and the iceberg trade cost eect, which measures the additional output needed to deliver one unit of output abroad. When the dierence in population is large, the size of rms in the more (less) populated country shrinks (expands) with trade opening. Indeed, the market access eect for rms in the smaller (larger) country overcomes (is dominated by) the competition eect when the foreign market is larger (smaller) than the domestic market. By contrast, when the dierence between the two populations is small, trade liberalization shifts the size of rms in both countries in the same direction. However, how rm size varies with trade costs is unclear.
This indeterminacy nds its origin in the denition of a rm size that includes the quantity of output needed for the rm to export. When it is recognized that a rm often hires a carrier to ship its output, its size is equal to the total consumption of the rm product. In this event, the iceberg cost eect mentioned above disappears. Dening the net size of a rm as its total sales rather than total output, we are able to show that trade liberalization always leads rms to grow when the dierence between the two populations is small. This suggests that the iceberg trade cost assumption leads to an articial denition of a rm's size and to results that may be driven by this peculiar modeling strategy.
Firms' prots obey a similar logic. Two cases may arise. In the rst one, the bigger country is very large. We then show that the competition eect overcomes the market-access eect, which implies that trade liberalization lowers rms' prots. In the smaller country, the eect is opposite. Thus, in the larger country rms lobby their government in favor of a tougher trade policy that protects them against the entry of foreign products. By contrast, producers in the smaller country lobby in favor of trade liberalization to access the foreign market. In the second case, countries have similar population sizes and rms' prots move in the same direction in both countries. This is because the market access and competition eects are more or less the same in each country. However, prots can increase or decrease. As a consequence, market integration can make rm-owners better-or worse-o.
Last, we show that the price of a domestic variety in the capital-poor country is higher (lower) than the one in the capital-rich country when the demand elasticity is increasing (decreasing). Under the same condition of the demand elasticity, the price of an imported variety in the capital-poor country exceeds that in the capital-richer country.
Furthermore, unlike the CES, we show that, depending on the behavior of demand elasticity, rms' pricing exhibits richer behaviors such as dumping (Brander and Krugman, 1983) or reverse dumping (Greenhut et al., 1985) . When the elasticity of demand increases (decreases), rms practice dumping (reverse dumping) in both countries. In other words, the behavior of demand elasticity is the only driving force for dumping or reverse dumping to arise.
The model is presented in Section 2. The main results are derived and discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes.
Trade Model
We assume that the world economy includes two countries named Home and Foreign. To simplify the aggregate demands of capital owners and workers, we assume two sectors called (traditionally) manufacturing and agriculture, with the latter used as numeraire. Manufacturing includes one dierentiated good; agriculture includes one homogeneous good.
Lower-tier utilities dened on dierentiated products are general and embedded in an upper-tier quasi-linear utility. Though admittedly restrictive, we want to argue that there are at least two sensible reasons for using a quasi-linear setting. First, in a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preferences, we would face the wage non-equalization problem. Thus, income eects would interfere with the various eects we focus on. Thus, using quasilinear preferences reduces drastically the role of supply-side restrictions and allows focusing on product and capital markets, abstracting from potentially complicated labor-market-based ingredients. Second, we stress that using quasilinear preferences for studying international trade issues is far from being a novelty. For example, using quasi-linear preferences Grossman and Helpman (1994) The consumer side includes L identical consumers, each of them either a worker or/and a capital owner. There is a total mass K of capital endowment in the world. Workers supply one unit of labor, whereas capital owners supply one unit of capital, both inelastically. Thus the world economy has a total population L, a total capital endowment K, and a some total labor endowment that will play no role in our analysis. θ and (1 − θ) are the share of agents in Home and Foreign, and λ and (1 − λ) are the share of capital endowment in these countries. We assume that the Home country has a larger supply of capital, i.e., λ 
where p a is the price of the agriculture good, E j , j ∈ {H, F } is income. For a pure worker, E = 1, whereas the income of pure capital owners in Home and Foreign equals the interest rates E = π H , E = π F , respectively. (With quasi-linearity, we need no assumptions of such separated ownership or any mixed ownership of capital.) Both utility functions u(·) and V (·) are thrice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing (at least at some zone of equilibria [0,x)) and strictly concave with u(0) = 0. Unlike Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Behrens and Murata (2007), we do not assume a specic form of function u(·).
The rst-order condition for the consumer's problem implies the inverse demand function p for variety k:
Here µ i > 0 denotes the marginal utility of expenditure for manufacturing, because it is the country's Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint in the sub-optimization problem
where m i is the satisfaction from manufacturing, and endogenous E m > 0 is the expenditure for it. On the production side, as it standard, the agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and with constant returns to scale. The marginal production cost equals one unit of labor, hence, price p a ≡ 1. The manufacturing sector presents homogeneous rms. Each manufacturing rm incurs a xed cost of one unit of capital and a marginal cost amounting to one unit of labor. Thus, the total production cost equals C(q) = π + wq, where π is the price of capital (interest rate) and y stands for output. Our approach to these questions diers from that in Helpman and Krugman's (1987) classical book. They assume some substitution between labor and capital as well as general equilibrium but standard CES utility that shadows the price eects explored in the next subsection.
We, however, reject the assumption of general equilibrium to get a tractable model of price eects stemming from variable elasticity of substitution.
Total demand (output) q H k of Home rm k and output q F k of Foreign rm k are given by
where τ > 1 is the iceberg-type trade cost for the manufactured good; in contrast, the agricultural good requires zero trade cost.
Labor is intersectorally mobile, and this leads to the same wages in both sectors, normalized without loss of generality to w = 1. Then total production cost of output q becomes
Each rm produces one unique variety, and each is produced by a single rm. Furthermore, we assume that the number of rms N is large enough to disregard the impact of each rm on the market. This means that each rm perceives current µ j , j = {H, F }, which is an aggregate market statistic analogous to the price index under CES preferences.
Home and Foreign rms maximize prots
where π H and π F are capital prices in Home and Foreign.
To assist with further analysis, we introduce a specic function that plays a critical role in what follows:
On the one hand, r u is the elasticity of the inverse-demand function for variety i. On the other hand, r u (z) can be treated as the relative love for variety (RLV). (For more discussion on this, see Vives, 1999; and Zhelobodko et al., 2012 .) We assume that r u (x) < 1, at least for some interval of x values. This restriction is both natural and helpful in further analysis. In particular, r u (z) for the widely-used CES-function (u(z) = z ρ ) is a constant: r u (z) = 1 − ρ.
For CARA-function (u(z) = 1 − e −ρz ), r u (z) increases linearly, but may decrease for some other functions. Mostly, we assume utilities that generate increasing inverse demand elasticity, which seems more natural (see Krugman, 1979; Vives, 1999) .
To guarantee concavity of prot function, we assume that
always holds. Under this assumption, the solution for each producer's problem is the same and unique (see Appendix A). It allows us to disregard producer's index k and study only the symmetric outcomes.
Using the rst-order condition for the producer's problem, we characterize the symmetric prot-maximizing prices
and markup as
For proof, see Appendix A.
We next consider the capital market balance. Since capital is immobile among countries, the mass of rms in each country is predetermined by the country's capital share:
Equilibrium. Consider equilibrium when both countries produce both dierentiated and homogeneous goods. We dene symmetric trade equilibrium as a bundle that satises consumers' maximization problem (1), (3); producers' maximization problem (6), (7); capital balance (12) ; and zero-prot condition:
Note that, in this paper, we focus only on equilibria with positive manufacturing and agricultural production in both countries. We call them completely diversied equilibria. 
Foreign consumption (x F F , x HF ) is found from a similar system resolved independently from (15) , (16) .
(ii) Consumption levels are independent of labor endowments.
(iii) There is at most one solution (x HH , x F H , x HF , x F F ) to these equilibrium equations.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The rst equilibrium equation essentially says that the ratio of marginal revenues 2 of local and foreign producers equals the ratio of their transportation costs. The second equation compares the marginal utility of income spent on manufacturing goods to the marginal utility from agriculture (substitution between manufacturing and agricultural goods). In studying comparative statics, it is often be useful create one equation from the equations (15) and (16), using function G:
where This section studies the impact of countries' asymmetry in factor endowments on trade. We rst explain how market size and capital endowment change the equilibria in the simplest setting a closed economy.
Opening trade: Transition from autarky to free trade equilibrium
At least since Krugman (1979) , an increase in a country's population (L) is often interpreted as a transition from autarky (innite trade cost) to free trade (zero trade cost). In our setting, it may induce an increase in the mass of consumers L or/and an increase in capital endowment K. We study the impacts of independent variations in both K and L on a closed economy, showing what happens to consumption and prices after a jump from autarky to integration. These two states are just the two endpoints of the globalization path, studied in the next subsection.
The equilibrium price is given by the monopoly pricing formula,
The number of rms in the economy is xed at N = K, for the per-rm capital requirement is normalized to one.
The closed economy counterpart of the equilibrium conditions (16) is a single equation,
2 Since total revenue is given by xu (x), it is readily veried that the marginal revenue equals u (x)[1 − ru(x)].
Since M R(·) and V (·) are both decreasing, (19) has a unique solution x * . Note that x * is independent of the population L. This result is a by-product of three essential ingredients of our modeling strategy: quasi-linear utility, constant marginal costs, and two non-substitutable production factors.
Plugging x * into (18), we pin down the equilibrium price p * . It remains to determine the capital price π * . The assumption about free entry implies that π = Lx(p − 1). Using (18), we come to
Equations (18) to (20) dene a unique symmetric equilibrium for the closed economy case. We now turn to comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to K and L.
Consumption. Dierentiating (19) with respect to K, we obtain
< 0 is the elasticity of marginal revenue.
(See Appendix C for details.)
Thus, an increase in capital supply K decreases the individual consumption level, whereas with an increase in population L, individual consumption remains unchanged. Why does x shrink as more rms enter? When the mass K of rms/varieties increases exogenously, the market crowding eect is at work, i.e., the consumer's expenditure for the manufacturing good is split among more varieties (all the varieties are consumed by strict concavity of u). On the other hand, it can easily be shown that the expenditure E m (K) ≡ Kp(x)x for manufacture increases less than proportionally (or even decreases) in K. (See Appendix C.) Thus the market expansion eect triggered by an increase in K is generically insucient to dominate the market crowding eect. As a result, x decreases. 3 Price and demand elasticity. The behavior of prices is more involved, being governed by demand elasticity dened in (8) and (18) . Clearly, the inverse demand elasticity r u (x) increases/decreases if and only if the elasticity of the direct demand ε(p) ≡ p x dx dp increases/decreases, although these two magnitudes are inverse to each other at a given point ε(p) = 1/r u (x(p)). The reason is that x(p) decreases. That is why we use, here and later in the paper, the term increasingly elastic demand (IED) as a synonym for r u (x) > 0, and decreasingly-elastic demand (DED) as a synonym for r u (x) < 0. Naturally, CES utility is the borderline case or iso-elastic demand, i.e., r u (x) = 1 − ρ, r u (x) ≡ 0.
Dierentiating the pricing equation (18) with respect to K, we obtain dp dK
3 The only exception is the limiting case when V is linear. Then, Em(K) is proportional to K, and the two eects balance each other exactly. Consequently, x remains unchanged.
We observe that, under increasing /decreasing demand elasticity (IED /DED case), the equilibrium price decreases /increas with transition from autarky to free trade because of a capital supply shock, and the markup M ≡ p−c p changes in the same direction. Both equilibrium price and markup are generically independent of the population L and are independent from K under CES utility.
Prices are independent of the market size L for the same reasons that consumption levels are. As for the price eect (22) , economic intuition suggests that price p should decrease with the number of competitors K. However, this occurs only under increasing inverse demand elasticity. Seemingly surprising, the price increase under decreasing demand elasticity is, however, typical in monopoly theory. With the downward shift of the inverse demand schedule (1) In any case, both classes of utilities are worth studying. The analysis of trade that follows also shows the importance of distinguishing between price-decreasing and price-increasing eects governed by IED or DED classes of demand.
Capital price (interest rate). Transition from autarky to free trade means increasing either market size L, capital supply K, or both. Whether the capital price increases or decreases depends on the structure of changes in factor endowments. We show now that capital price always decreases (increases) with capital supply (market size), regardless of the type of demand.
The return on a unit of capital (on the xed cost) is the price margin multiplied by output: π = (p − 1)Lx. Should capital price shrink when capital supply K increases? Dierentiating π with respect to capital supply yields
since ε M R < 0 , 0 < r u (x) < 1, and
This derivative is obviously negative under both IED and DED cases. Under IED, the result is clear: both individual consumption and price go down, which, in turn, leads to a decrease in capital price. In the DED case, the price increase is always outweighed by a stronger decrease in individual consumption.
A similar question relates to L. Dierentiating equation (20) with respect to L, we nd that the impact of market size on capital price π is unambiguously positive:
Intuitively, since individual consumption does not depend on the number of consumers, rm size (equilibrium output) and prots both increase with the number of consumers. Thus, the capital price always increases with the population (number of consumers) and decreases with industry size (capital endowment).
Welfare. Transition to free trade from autarky changes the welfare of two agent types, workers and capital owners (a consumer may play both roles simultaneously).
First, we consider the changes in the worker's welfare. From (19), we see that the equilibrium utility of each worker does not depend on the population size because the manufacturing consumption x does not change and income does not change.
As for the impact of K, under IED (in particular, under CES, which is the limiting case), each worker should benet from additional capital: the price decreases (or remains constant) and a broader variety becomes available for a lower price (by the revealed-preference argument). So, under IED, the worker's utility is not aected by an increase in market size and increases with capital supply. Consequently, opening up trade increases worker's utility. However, the outcome in the DED case is less evident: the increasing variety struggles with the decreasing price.
Using the envelope theorem, it is readily veried that the partial derivative of worker's utility with respect to capital supply is given by
One can see that the rst term is positive and related to an increasing number of varieties. The second term is related to the change in price, which increases under the DED case. Which eect is stronger depends on the strength of the price decrease.
Second, we discuss the welfare of pure capital owners who do not own labor. It is clear that the utility of each capital owner increases with the population, because consumption x does not change, while the capital price π increases and this additional income can be spent on numeraire.
An increasing capital supply increases variety that struggles with the decrease in such consumers' income. The partial derivative of capitalist's utility with respect to capital supply is
The rst and second terms are the same to worker's utility. The third term corresponds to the change in the agent's income that decreases with the capital supply (23) . Under a more natural IED case, the rst and second terms are positive, whereas the third one is negative. Under a DED case, only rst term is positive. So it is more likely that the utility of capital owners increases under the IED case. But, in general, an increase as well as a decrease in capitalists' utility can occur.
We conclude that dierent eects can take place with a change from autarky to free trade, depending on whether demands belong to the IED or DED class. In the next subsection, we will see that similar eects arise in the case of trade with non-zero nite transportation costs, although any eect arising from additional capital supply in a country is typically softened by the existence of its trade partner.
Trade: impact of capital asymmetry and globalization
Having compared autarky and integration, we now study the trade equilibrium under non-trivial trade cost 1 < τ < ∞.
We produce comparative statics of consumption levels, prices, rm sizes, and capital prices with respect to two key parameters: the asymmetry in capital endowments and trade cost.
Individual consumptions
To compare the consumption of Home and Foreign varieties, we analyze the monotonicity of the expressions in our equilibrium system (15) and (16) . We argue in three steps to get inequality (24) below, using the following conclusions.
(i) Individual consumption of a domestically produced variety in each country is higher than the consumption of any imported variety (x HH > x F H , x F F > x HF ) because, in this model, various competition eects never outweigh the downward pressure of trade costs on import consumption.
(ii) Consumption of a domestic variety is smaller in the country with a higher capital endowment (x
because each consumer splits his or her expenditure among a greater mass of varieties.
(iii) It is obvious that x HH > x HF when the countries are symmetric. Moreover, it remains true even for highly asymmetric capital (when λ is close to 1). Indeed, at the limiting case λ = 1 (no capital in Foreign), the dierentiated goods are produced only in the Home country. As the price for Foreign consumers includes trade costs, we have
x HH > x HF . On the other hand, it follows immediately from the above results for a closed economy that x HH (x HF ) decreases (increases) with λ for all λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence, regardless of the countries' asymmetry in capital,
All these inequalities and other properties of equilibrium consumption can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. (i) Under asymmetry λ > 0.5, the equilibrium individual consumption of the varieties is ordered as
(ii) An increasing share λ of Home capital or/and total world capital makes the consumption of both domestic and imported varieties in Home decrease:
(iii) Trade liberalization hampers the consumption of any domestic variety and enhances the consumption of imports, whereas increasing trade costs work in the opposite fashion:
Therefore, the analysis of the inuence of globalization produces no surprises: the domestic varieties are crowded out by the imported varieties that become cheaper. Unlike endogenous capital settings, in this model, such an eect occurs even without changes in variety: the range of goods remains the same, but the cost decrease per se is sucient for crowding. Statement (iii) above also describes crowding: the more competitors there are, the less market share remains for others.
Prices and dumping
Using Proposition 2 and pricing rule (9) , (10), we can compare prices and characterize the price behavior of producers in each country.
To discuss this question, we shall introduce the following denition: dumping practice by any rm means that its mill price times the trade coecient exceeds its export price:
whereas the opposite inequality is called reverse dumping.
Proposition 3. Domestic varieties are always cheaper than imported ones (p(x ii ) < p(x ji )), and (considering the trade pass-through) three pricing patterns are possible:
(i) Increasingly elastic demand (IED) yields dumping pricing practiced by Home and Foreign rms, and the dumping by Foreign rms is stronger:
(ii) Decreasingly elastic demand (DED) yields reverse dumping used by each rm, and the reverse dumping by Foreign rms is stronger:
(iii) Firms in both countries relax dumping (reverse dumping) under trade liberalization. Furthermore, rm in each country weaken dumping and/or reverse dumping in response to an increase in the country's capital share.
Corollary. Iso-elasic demand (CES) implies proportional export pricing (p ii = p ij /τ ).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Hence, all Home and Foreign rms adopt the same pricing behavior, which in the IED situation (the most realistic) amounts to dumping. And, in all situations, the smaller the country, the greater the distortion of its export price.
To illustrate how (reverse) dumping is enforced or hampered by the trade cost and countries' asymmetry, we x that demonstrates the rst IED property (for small x), and then the DED property. In gure 1c, under τ < τ 0 = 2.41, the equilibrium price behavior shows reverse dumping. With the trade cost between τ 0 < τ < τ 1 = 2.54, the producers from Home (which has a larger capital stock and therefore accommodates more rms) practice dumping, whereas Foreign producers practice reverse dumping. When trade costs are fairly high (τ > τ 1 ), producers from both countries practice dumping.
To sum up, the pricing patterns chosen by rms depend critically on variable elasticity of substitution in a way that diers greatly from what we know of the CES-utility case, where non-trivial market segmentation cannot arise.
Thus, in contrast to the conventional wisdom adopted in trade literature, cooperative behavior of the exporters is IED ⇒ dp ii dτ > 0; DED ⇒ dp ii dτ < 0; DED ⇒ dp ij dτ > 0.
(ii) Growing a country's share of capital (λ for Home, (1 − λ) for Foreign) makes its prices p ii ,p ji of domestic and imported goods decrease (increase) under IED (DED), in particular,
Under IED: dp HH dλ < 0, dp F H dλ < 0, dp F F dλ > 0 and dp HF dλ > 0; (28) Under DED: dp HH dλ > 0, dp F H dλ > 0, dp F F dλ < 0 and dp HF dλ < 0.
(iii) With an increase in total world capital K, all prices in each country shift in the same direction as reactions (28)- (29) to the country's capital share.
Note that the case of CES preferences is the borderline one between increasing and decreasing elasticity of demand, so any price eects are absent, which contradicts the data.
The reasoning behind point (ii) of Proposition 3 is as follows. An increase in λ invites more rms to enter the Home market, whereas the Foreign country accommodates fewer rms. Consequently, the mass of Home-(Foreign-) produced varieties increases (decreases). Thus, love for variety shifts x HH and x F H downward. Under IED (DED), this makes varieties better (worse) substitutes, and therefore competition on the Home market becomes tougher (weaker).
As a result, both p HH and p F H go down (up). With symmetry, the other two prices go in the opposite direction. imported varieties, which implies that importers acquire more market power and can charge higher markups. This is the indirect import-price eect. However, economic intuition suggests that imported prices decrease with trade liberalization. In the latter case (DED), the two eects go in the same direction, in other words, imported prices unambiguously decrease and domestic prices increase. To nd some empirical justication, we would propose that the price eects discussed above could explain manufacturing price dierentials between the developed and developing countries, given that capital is immobile. From this viewpoint, the results about prices obtained above mean that developed countries should have cheaper high-tech goods than less-developed countries, with this dierence decreasing with globalization. An alternative interpretation of K parameter could be either human capital or skilled labor supply. Of course, such a tendency is not necessarily evidenced in reality, shadowed by other tendencies. A plausible reason for this is the noticeable wage dierential between North and South. In our model, the forces generating this wage dierential are ruled out by the wage-equalization mechanism, which is widely used in the literature.
Capital price, rm size, and trade ows
In this subsection, we study the impact of asymmetry in countries' capital endowments on capital prices, outputs, and trade ows. Our analysis bears some resemblance to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin story. However, the monopolistic competition approach allows us to highlight new facets of the problem, which are inevitably ruled out under perfect competition.
For convenience, let e i stand for total exports of manufacturing good from country i:
With the agricultural sector serving as an equalizer, the two trade values above need not balance each other.
Therefore, we can nd who exports more and where the capital price is higher. Studying expressions (30)- (31) and (13)- (14), we can compare the equilibrium capital prices, export volumes, and rm sizes in the two countries. However, from now on we shall distinguish gross rm sizes q H ≡ θL · x HH + τ (1 − θ)L · x HF measured in physical costs from net rm sizes y H ≡ θL · x HH + (1 − θ)L · x HF measured in outputs which do not include trade costs.
Proposition 5. (i) When the countries are symmetric in terms of population (θ = 1/2), the country with capital abundance (Home) has a lower capital price π H and a higher value of exports in manufacturing e H :
(ii) Assume that u (x) > 0 and r u (x) < 3. Then q H < q F and y H < y F .
Corollary. Home exports in physical units exceed those of Foreign:
Proof: See Appendix E.
Why such inequalities? The market-crowding eect is at work here, whereas the market-access eect is eliminated by our assumptions of quasi-linear utility and similar populations in Home and Foreign. Low output q H at Home is the consequence of the market-crowding eect 4 . Intuitively, a low capital price at Home is implied by the larger capital supply. A low output by rms, q H , does not allow the rms to get the benets from increasing returns to scale. This leads to a decrease in the Home capital price, which is reinforced by tougher competition in the market for capital. More intriguing is the fact that, despite the low q H , total exports of manufacturing goods from Home are higher. This result has at least two justications. First, there are more rms at Home. Second, market-crowding eect at the Foreign market is weaker than at Home. Thus partial specialization of countries takes place: the Foreign country becomes more agricultural and the Home country becomes more industrial. Moreover, capital abundance at Home increases the exports from Home and decreases its imports making the world less symmetric.
Firm size under trade liberalization
We now turn to studying how trade liberalization (i.e., a reduction in τ ) aects gross rm sizes q H , q F and net rm sizes y H , y F measured in outputs net of trade costs. We argue that usual interpretation of variables q i as outputs is not quite realistic. It would mean, that rms do pay for transportation with its production and, thereby, articially overestimate the real output. Instead, y shows what is really produced and consumed.
The gross size of a typical Home rm is given by
To disentangle the main forces that are at work with a decrease in τ , we decompose dq H as follows:
The rst term in (32) is unambiguously negative: trade liberalization leads to a reduction in x HH because of tougher competition with foreign rms. This is the standard competition eect. 
The second term in (32) is positive: a reduction in trade costs leads to an increase in trade ow. This term can be interpreted as a measure of the market access eect.
Finally, the third term in (32) is negative, for dτ < 0. This term arises because lower trade costs mean that rms have to produce less in order to export the same amount. Stated another way, a decrease in τ triggers the iceberg trade cost eect.
Comparative statics of rm size with respect to τ depends on whether the market-access eect dominates the other two eects, given the relative country size characteristics θ and λ. The following proposition describes the behavior of gross rm sizes under almost free trade, i.e., when τ is close to one. 5 When εMR < −1, we also obtain a limiting case: thresholds in Figure 2b emerge from our square (θ H < 0 andθ F > 1) and we observe only one pattern when both outputs decrease under trade liberalization.
The above analysis was conducted for low trade costs that are close to zero (τ ≈ 1). Several comments and interpretations are in order.
First, Proposition 6 essentially says that trade liberalization results in a decrease (increase) in the gross size of rms in a country if the population of this country is suciently large (small), exceeding the threshold. The reason is that for rms based in a small country, the market-access eect generates large gains, which dominates the losses resulting from competition and transportation cost eects. Hence, rm sizes increase. For a large country, the argument is reversed. Why the rms located in the country with the higher population reduce their output in response to a decrease in trade costs? On one hand, trade liberalization makes access to the foreign market easier, and they increase output to serve it. On the other hand, output for local consumption decreases due to tougher competition between local and foreign rms. Since the local market is bigger, the decrease in total domestic sales volume exceeds the increase of export volume; therefore, the total sales volume decreases.
Second, it follows immediately from Proposition 6 that, when the population share θ is between the two threshold values (i.e., the population dierential between the two countries is relatively small), a decrease in τ shifts q H and q F in the same direction. However, rm sizes increase or decrease depending on the sign ofθ
, which is the same for all λ according to part (iii). 6
When the countries' populations are close in size to each other, the only dierence between cases (a) and (b) in Figure 2 is the output behavior. Case (a) when both rm sizes increases with trade liberalization seems more
natural. So what is the reason for the reduction in the size of rms in case (b)? Apparently, such a surprising outcome is due mainly to the iceberg trade cost eect. In essence, variables q i describe gross outputs which would be true if a rm payed for transportation with its production and thus the transporter were a third country consuming the commodity alike Home and Foreign. Reduction of this third consumption under globalization is the explanation of surprising reduction in q i .
Let us get rid of this eect and show the eect of globalization on net rm sizes y H and y F , which do not include transportation costs: (ii) y F increases with trade liberalization if and only if population share θ >θ F .
Proof : See Appendix F.
These ndings on net rm sizes are shown in Figure 3 , using the same example as Figure 2b .
Here one can see that under suciently dierent countries similarity with gross outputs: for the larger country competition eect dominates but for smaller country market access eect is stronger. However, unlike gross rm sizes, no surprising eects occur under almost equal countries: globalization naturally increases outputs.
One more question of interest is whether trade liberalization eliminates or intensies dissimilarities between rms in dierent countries. A possible measure of rm dissimilarities is the dierential rm size (q H − q F ). We nd that the dierence between the sizes of rms does not depend on upper-tier utility and increases (decreases) when ε M R > −1
. It is easily shown that, even in one given class of familiar lower-tier utility functions (CARA, HARA, quadratic utility), both opportunities can take place: the dierential can grow or fall. However, if the lower-tier utility is of the CES type, then ε M R = ρ − 1 > −1; the dierential increases.
We conclude that the variable elasticity of substitution is important for outputs as well as for prices, but CES is not a borderline between dierent patterns.
Capital price under trade liberalization
In this subsection, we analyze capital price behavior under trade liberalization, proceeding in the same way as we studied rm size behavior.
The capital price in Home is given by
Again, we want to disclose the main eects that a decrease in τ triggers. To do this, we decompose dπ H as follows:
Here we have four eects: three are the same as in the story about rm sizes, and the fourth is a new eect. The rst term in (33) is unambiguously negative: trade liberalization leads to a reduction in operating prots from local markets because of tougher competition with foreign rms. This is the standard competition eect.
The second term in (33) is positive: a reduction in trade costs leads to an increase in trade ows. This term can be interpreted as a measure of market access eect.
The third term in (33) Proof: See Appendix I.
We illustrate Proposition 8 in Figure 4 with our examples when the upper-tier utility is V (m) = log(m) and the lower-tier utility is u = √ x ± Second, under relatively same populations we observe the same patterns as for rm sizes, i.e., capital price goes in the same direction in both countries (either decreases or increases). Under trade liberalization rms become better o We also study the capital price dierential across countries, which is given by
Clearly, the capital price dierential decreases with trade liberalization if and only if Home country has both a larger population and a larger capital endowment. One notes that the higher the asymmetry in population size, the faster the dierence in capital price decreases in τ .
One might conjecture that, under assumptions of footloose capital, we shall observe a Home Market Eect independent of asymmetry in market and industry size, as well as a form of upper-and low-tier utilities.
Conclusion
We develop a new two-factor, two-sector trade model in order to capture the impact of countries' asymmetry in capital and population, as well as variable markups, on trade patterns. The novelty of the approach is combining the Heckscher-Ohlin methodology based on disparities in factor endowments with monopolistic competition. To endogenize markups, we use non-specied quasi-linear utilities that can generate both increasingly and decreasingly elastic demands (IED and DED). We nd that, when a country switches from autarky to integration into the free trade world, then under IED (DED), the equilibrium commodity price decreases (increases) with capital supply.
We next examine the implications of globalization in a two-country world with positive nite trade costs. In the model, the Home country has a larger endowment of capital than does the Foreign. The basic result for the closed economy case has several important implications for trade.
First, the domestic variety is always cheaper than the imported one; prices in the Home country are lower (higher) than in the Foreign country under IED (DED), and, rms located in both countries practice (reverse) dumping under IED (DED), both policies reinforced by scarcity of capital. All these dierences increase with trade cost and capital asymmetry. Iso-elastic demands generated by the CES utility function are the borderline case, in which the model exhibits degenerate behavior.
Second, globalization triggers two opposing eects: the Foreign market becomes more easily available to Home producers (market-access eect), whereas Home market becomes available to foreigners (competition eect). As a result, rms may face both gains and losses, depending on which of the two eects dominates. The outcome diers for cases of very asymmetric and almost symmetric populations in the countries. When asymmetry is high, the marketaccess eect unambiguously dominates the competition eect in a country with much lower population, because rms get better access to the much larger foreign market. Hence, the capital price in this lower-population country always increases. The behavior of the capital price in the other country is the reverse. However, we also nd that, when countries are almost symmetric in population, trade liberalization shifts capital prices in both countries in the same direction. Whether capital prices increase or decrease depends on which of the two eects suppresses the other. The pattern for the size of rms is quite similar and follows the same logic.
Third, depending on the interpretation of production factors, which need not necessarily be treated as capital and labor, we can use our results to explain the impact of trade liberalization on a broad variety of economic phenomena, including globalization-driven shifts in the returns on human capital, the structure of wages paid to dierent kinds of labor, etc.
Finally, the country with the higher capital-population ratio is a net exporter of manufacturing goods, i.e., there is partial specialization in the countries and home market eect is observed.
These ndings highlight the importance of variable markups in international trade studies. Possible extensions include partially substitutable labor and capital, general equilibrium settings, and footloose capital.
.
The strict second order condition of the producer's program:
Appendix B: equilibrium equations and consumption
At equilibrium, the inverse demands equal the producer's optimal prices, i.e.,
Dividing the equations we get the system described in Proposition 1:
Proof of Proposition 2. Rewrite equation (15) as follows We dierentiated function r u (x) with respect to x:
Let us dene two functions, y and G.
1. Imported consumption z(x, τ ) as a function of domestic one is dened from equation
2. Function G(x, s, K, τ ) expressing marginal utility is dened as
To we study the behavior z as a function of x, we dierentiate the equation dening z with respect to x:
Thus, we have obtained positive dependence between the consumptions of local and imported varieties in each country.
Further, the derivative of z with respect to trade cost is found from
Now we turn to studying function G(x, λ, K, τ ). Based on our ndings, the argument of function V (λKu(x) +
(1 − λ) Ku(z(x, τ ))) strictly increases with individual consumption of local variety x, Home capital share λ, total capital endowment K. It also strictly decreases with trade cost τ . Then function V (λKu(
strictly decreases with x, λ, K and strictly increases with τ . As we have seen, u (x)(1 − r u (x)) strictly decreases with x. Consequently function G(x, λ, K, τ ) strictly decreases with λ, x and K and strictly increases with τ . Since function G(x, λ, K, τ ) is strictly monotone with x there is at most one solution to the equation determining Home consumption:
G(x HH , λ, K, τ ) = 1.
Based on the monotonicity of function G, the solution x HH to this equation strictly decreases with λ and K and strictly increases with τ .
So, we nd out that: (i) the consumption of domestic variety (x HH , x F F ) decreases with country's capital share (λ or (1 − λ) ) and K and strictly increases with τ ; (ii) the consumption of imported variety (x F H , x HF ) decreases with country's capital share, K and τ .
Similarly, the solution of equation
determines the individual consumption of varieties in Foreign. Since function G(x, λ, K, τ ) strictly decreases with λ, x and K and strictly increases with τ , the consumption of domestic varieties is less in Home country, posessing a bigger share of capital (i.e., x F F > x HH ). Similar reasoning brings us to expression x HF > x F H .
In section 3.2.1 we have proved that x HH > x HF . Consequently there is the only sorting individual consumptions:
QED.
Appendix C: comparative statics of closed economy
We derive the comparative statics of Subsection 3.1 step by step, in the same order as its claims.
(i) Consumption. Dierentiating equation (19) with respect to capital endowment K we get
< 0 is the elasticity of the marginal revenue.
(ii) Price and demand elasticity. We denote the expenditure on manufactured good as E m (K):
The expenditure elasticity w.r.t. the capital endowment is
since r u (x) < 1, r u (x) < 2, and dx dK < 0.
(iii) Capital price (interest rate). Capital price is
We nd capital price derivative with respect to capital endowment:
Q.E.D.
Appendix D: dumping
Proof of Proposition 3. Since x F F > x HF and x HH > x F H , from decreasing demand we immediately obtain inequalities p HH < p F H and p F F < p HF , or, in other words, p ii < p ij .
The ordering of individual consumption is
Claim (i). In the IED case
Consequently,
Claim (ii). In the DED case 
Claim (iii
Since the countries have the same populations (θ = 0.5) we have
Its derivative with respect to x is
since function xu (x) = λxp(x) strictly increases and x > z. Function s(x) strictly increases and x HH < x F F , so we
Foreign capital price exceeds Home capital price under same countries populations.
Claim (ii). Since the countries' sizes are equal, the total export volumes for home e H and foreign e F country are
Consider function v(x) = px. We study monotonicity of this function:
We have found that total country's export strictly increases with x. Since x HF > x F H and λ > 1 − λ, total Home export exceeds Foreign one:
Claim (iii). The gross rm sizes in Home and Foreign are:
Let s 2 (x) = x − τ z(x, τ ). We dierentiated it with respect to x using (15):
So under assumptions u (x) ≥ 0 and r u (x) ≤ 3 we get
It means that the gross rm size in Home is less then in Foreign.
Similarly we get the conclusion about net rm sizes y H < y F .
Q.E.D. (15), (16):
Appendix
We nd elasticities with respect to trade cost:
where ε u (x ij )(1−ru(x ij )) is the elasticity of marginal revenue M R = u (x ij )(1 − r u (x ij )) with respect to τ . Let x = x HH = x F F = x F H = x HF , then all marginal revenue and utility elasticities are the same, and we denote:
, and r V = −ε V . Then
Using the rst equation
we insert it to the second one and get
Then the elasticity of imported consumption is
Similarly we use the equilibrium equations for Foreign consumption
and nd the elasticities with respect to trade costs
Similarly we derive another elasticity
Thus we have found the elasticities of individual consumption in Foreign
Claim (i). Now we turn to gross rm size behavior in Home:
The derivative of the gross rm size in Home with respect to trade costs is
Using elasticities for individual consumption we get
The rm size in Home increases with trade liberalization when
We denoteθ
We are interested in behavior of the rm's size when 0 < θ < 1 and 1 2 < λ < 1. Here we have two cases:
It is easy show that in this area the rm size in Home increases when θ <θ H ;
This case brings us to the same result: the rm size in Home increases when θ <θ H .
Thus we have proved claim (i) of Proposition 6 and turn to proving claim (ii).
Claim (ii). The gross rm size in Foreign is:
The derivative of the rm size under small trade costs is:
Inserting here elasticities ε x F F and ε x F H we get
The gross rm size in Foreign increases with trade liberalization when
Again we are interested in behavior of the rm's size when 0 < θ < 1 and 1 2 < λ < 1. We have two cases: Q.E.D.
Additional remark in this section says that the dierence in rm sizes is monotone. To prove this, note that the behavior of dierence in rm sizes is determined as:
and we have found that the sign of monotonicity of the gross form sizes dierential is determined by this expression.
Appendix G: net rm size under trade liberalization
Proof of Proposition 7. Now we eliminate the transportation sector as a consumer, and study the impact of globalization on net rm size y H :
We get the derivative with respect to trade cost:
Now we use the individual consumption elasticities under small trade cost from Appendix F and get:
The net Firm size in Home increases with trade liberalization when (2θ − 1)(1 − λ)r V ε u(x) + (1 − θ)ε M R < 0 ⇒ θ < (1 − λ)r V ε u(x) − ε M R 2(1 − λ)r V ε u(x) − ε M R .
We denoteθ H =
(1−λ)r V ε u(x) −ε M R 2(1−λ)r V ε u(x) −ε M R and nd similar derivative for net rm size in Foreign:
Using equations for individual consumption we get
Thus, the net rm size in Foreign increases with trade liberalization when θ(2λr V ε u(x) − ε M R ) − λr V ε u(x) > 0 ⇒ θ > λr V ε u(x) 2λr V ε u(x) − ε M R .
We denoteθ F = λr V ε u(x) 2λr V ε u(x) −ε M R and conclude that if θ <θ H , then y H increases, and if θ >θ F , then y F increases, Q.E.D.
Appendix H: simulations conrming robust globalization eects on rm size
We are going to show an example of monotone behavior of rm sizes for wide range of levels of trade cost (1 ≤ τ ≤ 1.25), shown in Figure 5 below. The idea is to conrm that Proposition 6 is likely to be extended from τ ≈ 1 to a wide range of trade cost. We take low-tier utility function u(x) = displays case of θ = 0.6 >θ H .
Commenting these simulations, we observe that in the range 1/τ > 0.8, i.e., τ < ε M R = ε u (x)(1−ru(x)) = (u (x) + xu (x)) u (x) + xu (x) x = −r u (x) 2 − r u (x) 1 − r u (x) . .
. 
The capital price in Foreign increases with trade liberalization when . The second case among the above inequalities is impossible since λ > 
